Estabilidad política y tributación
[Taxation and political stability]
AbstractThe present study is, in particular, an attempt to test the relationship between tax level and political stability by using some economic control variables and to see the relationship among government effectiveness, corruption, and GDP. For the purpose, we used the Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach in the panel framework, using a country-level panel data from 59 countries for the period 2002 to 2008. The salient features of this model are: (a) simplicity is based on a limited number of variables (five) are categorical or continuous and not dependent on complex interactions or nonlinear effects. (b) accuracy: a low level of errors, the model achieves a high percentage of accuracy in distinguishing countries with inclination to political instability, compared to countries with political stability, (c) generality: the model allows to distinguish types of political instability, both resulting from acts of violence and failure of democracies to show, and (d) novelty: the model incorporates a tool that helps evaluate and exclude many variables used by the conventional literature. This approach is mainly based on the recognition of state structures and the relations between elites and parties.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32414.
Date of creation: 25 Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Taxation; Political Stability; Connection; Effects; Panel VAR analysis;
Other versions of this item:
- Fernando, Estrada & Mihai, Mutascu & Aviral Kumar, Tiwari, 2013.
"Estabilidad política y tributación
[Taxation and political stability]," MPRA Paper 45226, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
- B22 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Macroeconomics
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- E17 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- O50 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - General
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
- B23 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Econometrics; Quantitative and Mathematical Studies
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2011-08-02 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-MAC-2011-08-02 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2011-08-02 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Volkerink, BjÃ¸rn & Haan, Jakob de, 1999. "Political and institutional determinants of the tax mix : an empirical investigation for OECD countries," Research Report 99E05, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
- Ivo Bischoff & Wolfgang Gohout, 2010. "The political economy of tax projections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 133-150, April.
- Dhaneshwar Ghura & BenoÃ®t Mercereau, 2004. "Political Instability and Growth: The Central African Republic," IMF Working Papers 04/80, International Monetary Fund.
- Ceyhun Elgin, 2010. "Political Turnover, Taxes and the Shadow Economy," Working Papers 2010/08, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
- M Arellano & O Bover, 1990.
"Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-Components Models,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0007, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
- Fabrizio Carmignani, 2003. "Political Instability, Uncertainty and Economics," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 1-54, February.
- Marina Azzimonti, 2009.
"Barriers to investment in polarized societies,"
2009 Meeting Papers
1233, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Bussiere, Matthieu & Mulder, Christian, 2000.
"Political Instability and Economic Vulnerability,"
International Journal of Finance & Economics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 5(4), pages 309-30, October.
- Bohn, Frank, 2003.
"Public Finance under Political Instability and Debt Conditionality,"
Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003
25, Royal Economic Society.
- Frank Bohn, 2002. "Public Finance under Political Instability and Debt Conditionality," Economics Discussion Papers 540, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Aizenman, Joshua & Jinjarak, Yothin, 2005.
"The collection efficiency of the value added tax: theory and international evidence,"
Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt42d103zh, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Joshua Aizenman & Yothin Jinjarak, 2008. "The collection efficiency of the Value Added Tax: Theory and international evidence," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 391-410.
- Joshua Aizenman & Yothin Jinjarak, 2005. "The Collection Efficiency of the Value Added Tax: Theory and International Evidence," NBER Working Papers 11539, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Palan, Ronen, 2002. "Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(01), pages 151-176, December.
- Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2005.
"Optimal Redistributive Taxation when Government’s and Agents’ Preferences Differ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1429, CESifo Group Munich.
- Blomquist, Soren & Micheletto, Luca, 2006. "Optimal redistributive taxation when government's and agents' preferences differ," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1215-1233, August.
- Blomquist, Sören & Micheletto, Luca, 2005. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation when Government’s and Agents’ Preferences Differ," Working Paper Series 2005:7, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Estrada, Fernando, 2010. "Devouring the Leviathan: fiscal policy and public expenditure in Colombia," MPRA Paper 21981, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Paul Collier, 2009. "The political economy of state failure," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 219-240, Summer.
- Alex Cukierman & Sebastian Edwards & Guido Tabellini, 1989.
"Seigniorage and Political Instability,"
NBER Working Papers
3199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Love, Inessa & Zicchino, Lea, 2006. "Financial development and dynamic investment behavior: Evidence from panel VAR," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 190-210, May.
- Devereux, Michael B. & Wen, Jean-Francois, 1998. "Political instability, capital taxation, and growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1635-1651, November.
- Henrik Hammar & Sverker C. Jagers & Katarina Nordblom, 2008. "Attitudes towards Tax Levels: A Multi-Tax Comparison," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 29(4), pages 523-543, December.
- Bell, Stephanie, 2001. "The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 149-63, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.