Disinvestment, lending relationships and executive compensation: Evidence from the Indian experience
AbstractThe analysis employs data on federal Government-owned public enterprises (PSEs) since the 1980s that encompasses the partial privatization program to examine the likelihood of privatization. The results indicate that employment-intensive, high-paying but less profitable firms are more likely to be privatized. In terms of lending relationships, the analysis indicates that private banks are the main bank for small firms and foreign banks are the main bank for large, established firms. State-owned banks are more likely to be associated with leveraged PSEs as compared to other bank groups. In terms of compensation policies in PSEs, the evidence testifies that bigger, established and leveraged PSE firms pay higher salaries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32071.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Global Business Review 2.12(2011): pp. 213-235
Partial privatization; public enterprises; relationship lending; executive compensation; India;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-13 (All new papers)
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