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Disinvestment, lending relationships and executive compensation: Evidence from the Indian experience

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  • Ghosh, Saibal

Abstract

The analysis employs data on federal Government-owned public enterprises (PSEs) since the 1980s that encompasses the partial privatization program to examine the likelihood of privatization. The results indicate that employment-intensive, high-paying but less profitable firms are more likely to be privatized. In terms of lending relationships, the analysis indicates that private banks are the main bank for small firms and foreign banks are the main bank for large, established firms. State-owned banks are more likely to be associated with leveraged PSEs as compared to other bank groups. In terms of compensation policies in PSEs, the evidence testifies that bigger, established and leveraged PSE firms pay higher salaries.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32071.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Publication status: Published in Global Business Review 2.12(2011): pp. 213-235
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32071

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Keywords: Partial privatization; public enterprises; relationship lending; executive compensation; India;

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  1. Berger, Allen N. & Klapper, Leora F. & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Zaidi, Rida, 2006. "Bank ownership type and banking relationships," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3862, The World Bank.
  2. Guiso, Luigi & Minetti, Raoul, 2004. "Multiple Creditors and Information Rights: Theory and Evidence from US Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Paul H. Malatesta & Kathryn L. DeWenter, 2001. "State-Owned and Privately Owned Firms: An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage, and Labor Intensity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 320-334, March.
  4. Kay, J A & Thompson, D J, 1986. "Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(381), pages 18-32, March.
  5. Boardman, Anthony E & Vining, Aidan R, 1989. "Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 1-33, April.
  6. Bishop, Matthew R. & Kay, John A., 1989. "Privatization in the United Kingdom: Lessons from experience," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 643-657, May.
  7. Ongena, Steven & Smith, David C., 2000. "What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 26-56, January.
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