An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases
AbstractThis paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation-proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 31977.
Date of creation: 02 Jul 2011
Date of revision:
global warming; international agreement; weak renegotiation-proofness;
Other versions of this item:
- Kratzsch, Uwe & Sieg, Gernot & Stegemann, Ulrike, 2012. "An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 473-476.
- Kratzsch, Uwe & Sieg, Gernot & Stegemann, Ulrike, 2011. "An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases," Economics Department Working Paper Series 11, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2011-07-13 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-07-13 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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