Research in psychology suggests that some individuals are more sensitive to positive than to negative information while others are more sensitive to negative rather than positive information. I take these cognitive positive-negative asymmetries in information processing to a Bayesian decision-theory model and explore its consequences in terms of decisions and payoffs. I show that in monotone decision problems economic agents with more positive-responsive information structures are always better off, ex-ante, when they face problems where payoffs are relatively more sensitive to the action chosen when the state of nature is favorable.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
3146.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
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