Is regulatory quality related to industry performance? Evidence on telecommunications, gas and electricity in EU15
AbstractThis paper provides empirical evidence on ex ante and ex post indicators of regulatory quality and the relationship between those indicators and market performance in liberalised EU-15 network industries. We report a low level of regulatory independence and competence, a high level of cross-country variations in regulatory quality, and a prevalent absence of correlation between ex ante regulatory quality and ex post performance indicators. On the basis of these findings, we suggest that the design of national regulatory agencies (NRAs) in Europe is not optimal and may be conducive to regulatory ineffectiveness or outright regulatory failure. Nevertheless, the existence and strengthening of EU-level regulators could enable EU member states to reduce the risk of regulatory failure by encouraging coordination and adoption of best practice.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 31365.
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision: May 2009
Publication status: Published in Journal of Public Policy 3.29(2009): pp. 347-370
Economics of Regulation; European Public Policy; Regulatory Quality; European Network Industries.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L38 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Policy
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior,"
IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Ãconomie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse
44, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 232-262, Summer.
- William D. Berry, 1982. "Theories Of Regulatory Impact: The Roles Of The Regulator, The Regulated, And The Public," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 1(3), pages 436-441, 02.
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