Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle
AbstractBayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. In addition, by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world. More importantly, we find that the revelation principle is not always right by using the quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 30653.
Date of creation: 28 Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Quantum game theory; Mechanism design; Bayesian implementation; Revelation principle;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-05-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2011-05-14 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2011-05-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-05-14 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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