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Firm Ownership Type, Earnings Management and Auditor Relationships: Evidence from India

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  • Ghosh, Saibal

Abstract

Using data on Indian listed companies for 2005, the paper examines how firm ownership relates to auditor choice. More specifically, we test several hypotheses about the links between firm ownership, auditor relationships and earnings management. The results indicate that firms having high discretionary accruals are less likely to be audited by domestic entities. The analysis also suggests that domestic auditors are less likely to be preferred by both foreign and Indian private corporates.

Suggested Citation

  • Ghosh, Saibal, 2010. "Firm Ownership Type, Earnings Management and Auditor Relationships: Evidence from India," MPRA Paper 30322, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30322
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ghosh, Saibal, 2007. "External Auditing, Managerial Monitoring and Firm Valuation: An Empirical Analysis for India," MPRA Paper 17142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Yuan Ding & Hua Zhang & Junxi Zhang, 2007. "Private vs State Ownership and Earnings Management: evidence from Chinese listed companies," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 223-238, March.
    3. Craswell, Allen & Stokes, Donald J. & Laughton, Janet, 2002. "Auditor independence and fee dependence," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 253-275, June.
    4. Chaney, Paul K. & Faccio, Mara & Parsley, David, 2011. "The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 58-76, February.
    5. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    6. Francis, Jere R., 1984. "The effect of audit firm size on audit prices : A study of the Australian Market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 133-151, August.
    7. Joseph P. H. Fan & T. J. Wong, 2005. "Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 35-72, March.
    8. Ali, Ashiq & Chen, Tai-Yuan & Radhakrishnan, Suresh, 2007. "Corporate disclosures by family firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 238-286, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Ramesh Chandra Das & Chandra Sekhar Mishra & Prabina Rajib, 2018. "Firm-specific Parameters and Earnings Management: A Study in the Indian Context," Global Business Review, International Management Institute, vol. 19(5), pages 1240-1260, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    external auditing; firm ownership; multiple auditors; earnings management; ordered logit; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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