Päästökauppajärjestelmien linkittämisen ilmastopoliittiset vaikutukset
[Linking emissions trading systems and climate policy]
AbstractThis study analyses how linking emissions trading systems affects the economical aspects of climate policy at both national and international levels. The analysis focuses on cost-efficiency, distribution between participants, competitiveness and emissions targets. In addition we examine how linking affects the structure of emissions trading systems and decision-making. To analyse specific effects, we formulate a partial-equilibrium model to depict linking. With given assumptions, cost-efficiency of climate policy can be improved by linking local emissions trading systems and by switching from conventional credit-based systems to systems with “no lose” -targets, however the benefits are unevenly distributed between participants, inter alia, due to effects on competitiveness. Linking necessitates an international agreement on emissions levels between parties as linking changes the incentives to set an emissions target.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 30171.
Date of creation: Apr 2009
Date of revision:
Climate Change; Climate policy; Emissions trading; Carbon Market; Linking; EU ETS; Kyoto Protocol;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
- Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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