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Did the Maastricht treaty matter for macroeconomic performance?

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  • Baskaran, Thushyanthan

Abstract

We explore the impact of the Maastricht treaty on fiscal and macroeconomic outcomes in the EU with the difference-in-difference methodology. Our dataset covers 23 OECD countries over the 1975-2006 period. EU 15 countries are classified as the treatment and eight non-EU OECD countries as the control group. The results indicate that the provisions in the Maastricht treaty have been either irrelevant or even harmful for fiscal and macroeconomic developments in the EU. Evidence for a detrimental impact of the Maastricht criteria is particularly strong for the period after the start of the third stage of EMU

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 30106.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Publication status: Published in Kyklos 3.62(2009): pp. 331-358
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30106

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Keywords: Balanced budget rules; Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); Maastricht treaty;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Zohal Hessami, 2013. "Monetary Integration, Soft Budget Constraints, and the EMU Sovereign Debt Crises," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-03, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  2. Casimir Dadak, 2011. "Political Economy of the Euro Area Crisis," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 58(5), pages 593-604, December.
  3. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Zohal Hessami, 2011. "A Tale of Five PIIGS: Soft Budget Constraints and the EMU Sovereign Debt Crises," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2011-45, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.

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