Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Financial liberalization and contagion with unobservable savings

Contents:

Author Info

  • Panetti, Ettore

Abstract

How do market-based channels for the provision of liquidity affect financial liberalization and contagion? In order to answer this question, I extend the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of financial intermediation to a two-country environment with unobservable markets for borrowing and lending and comparative advantages in the investment technologies. I demonstrate that the role of hidden markets crucially depends on the level of financial integration of the economy. Despite always imposing a burden on intermediaries, unobservable markets allow agents to partially enjoy gains from financial integration when interbank markets are autarkic. In fully liberalized systems such effect instead disappears. Similarly, in autarky the distortion created by hidden markets improve the resilience of the system to unexpected liquidity shocks. With fully integrated interbank markets, such effect again disappears, as unexpected liquidity shocks always lead to bankruptcy and contagion.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29540/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 29540.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29540

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: financial intermediation; financial liberalization; financial contagion; unobservable savings;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Gorton, Gary, 1988. "Banking Panics and Business Cycles," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(4), pages 751-81, December.
  2. Tsyvinski, Aleh & Golosov, Mikhail & Farhi, Emmanuel, 2009. "A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial Intermediation," Scholarly Articles 4481504, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2006. "Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000445, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Zoltan Pozsar & Tobias Adrian & Adam Ashcraft & Hayley Boesky, 2010. "Shadow banking," Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 458, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  5. Panetti, Ettore, 2011. "Unobservable savings, risk sharing and default in the financial system," MPRA Paper 29542, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2003. "Financial Intermediaries and Markets," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania 00-44, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  7. Iyer, Rajkamal & Peydró, José-Luis, 2010. "Interbank contagion at work: evidence from a natural experiment," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 1147, European Central Bank.
  8. Masami Imai & Seitaro Takarabe, 2011. "Bank Integration and Transmission of Financial Shocks: Evidence from Japan," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 155-83, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Panetti, Ettore, 2011. "Unobservable savings, risk sharing and default in the financial system," MPRA Paper 29542, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Panetti, Ettore, 2011. "A Theory of Bank Illiquidity and Default with Hidden Trades," MPRA Paper 43799, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2012.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29540. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.