Non-reactive strategies in decision-form games
AbstractIn this paper we propose a concept of rationalizable solution for two-player decision-form games: the solution by iterated elimination of non-reactive strategies. Several original theorems are proved about this kind of solution. We study the relations between solutions by iterated elimination of non reactive strategies and game equilibria. We present an existence theorem for bistrategies surviving the iterated elimination and an existence theorem for solution by iterated elimination in contracting games. We, also, show that an equilibrium of a game survives iterated elimination of non-reactive strategies. At the end we prove a characterization of solvability by iterated elimination of non-reactive strategies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 29262.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in AAPP | Physical, Mathematical, and Natural Sciences 1.LXXXVI(2009): pp. 1-12
Decision-form games; rationalizable solution; reactivity; equilibrium; iterated elimination of strategies;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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