Effective Cost of Brain Drain
AbstractIn developing countries, remittances and intra-family private transfers sent by household members who migrate to more developed countries constitute a fundamental source of income and capital accumulation. Then, it is important to understand the motives of migrants who decide to remit back to their families. Drawing on the theory of labor migration under asymmetric information, we show that low-skilled workers are expected to provide higher amounts of remittances when remittances are motivated by self-interest. This transfer paradox is explained as follows. Since low skilled workers are likely to return home when informational symmetry is restored, the optimal remittance level is a decreasing function of the migrant's skill level since remittances may be seen as an implicit insurance, whose benefits are received only under migration return.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 29176.
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Remittances; asymmetric information; migration;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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