The redistributive role of non-profit organizations
AbstractBy starting from the consideration that non-profit organizations cover a significant re-distributive function beside that of governmental agencies, the paper questions why government prefers to finance via transfers private entities likewise lucrative and non-lucrative entities rather than produce these goods directly. By generalizing the Hansmann (1996) theory, we propose a “make or buy” approach in which the choice among three different ownership regimes (governmental, non-profit and for-profit) providing services in public benefit oriented sectors is affected not only by costs reduction (X-efficiency) but also by the level of transfers (degree of “redistribution”) decided at a political level.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28.
Date of creation: 01 May 2006
Date of revision:
non-profit organizations; redistribution; property rights;
Other versions of this item:
- Giovanni Cerulli, 2006. "The Redistributive Role of Non-profit Organizations," Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia 0036, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia.
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
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