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A Paradox of Environmental Awareness Campaigns

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  • Koulovatianos, Christos

Abstract

We build a workable game of common-property resource extraction under rational Bayesian learning about the renewal prospects of a resource. We uncover the impact of exogenously shifting the prior beliefs of each player on the response functions of others. What we find about the role of environmental conservation campaigns is paradoxical. To the extent that such campaigns instill overly high pessimism about the potential of natural resources to reproduce, they create anti-conservation incentives: anyone having exploitation rights becomes inclined to consume more of the resource earlier, before others overexploit, and before the resource's stock is reduced to lower levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Koulovatianos, Christos, 2010. "A Paradox of Environmental Awareness Campaigns," MPRA Paper 27260, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27260
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lomborg,Bjørn, 2001. "The Skeptical Environmentalist," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521010689.
    2. Guidolin, Massimo & Timmermann, Allan, 2007. "Properties of equilibrium asset prices under alternative learning schemes," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 161-217, January.
    3. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2008. "Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(4), pages 360-394, August.
    4. Koulovatianos, Christos & Mirman, Leonard J. & Santugini, Marc, 2009. "Optimal growth and uncertainty: Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 280-295, January.
    5. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carolina Achury & Christos Koulovatianos & John Tsoukalas, 2011. "External Sovereign Debt in a Monetary Union: Bailouts and the Role of Corruption," Discussion Papers 11/11, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).
    2. Christos Koulovatianos, 2015. "Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource Under Rational Learning About its Reproduction," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 94-119, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    renewable resources; resource exploitation; non-cooperative dynamic games; Bayesian learning; stochastic games; commons; rational learning; uncertainty; beliefs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • L70 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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