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Институциональные Ловушки И Экономические Реформы
[Institutional Traps and Economic Reforms]

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  • Polterovich, Victor

Abstract

The theory of institutional traps, i.e. ineffective but stable institutions or behavior norms, is develope din connection with economic reforms. Mechanisms are described that cause a system to get into a trap and ways of going out of it are analyzed. Concepts of transformation costs and trasitional rents are introduced. As examples of institutional traps, considered are such institutions, as barter, non-payments, tax evasion, and corruption. A game-theoretic model of the barter trap is given.

Suggested Citation

  • Polterovich, Victor, 1999. "Институциональные Ловушки И Экономические Реформы [Institutional Traps and Economic Reforms]," MPRA Paper 27257, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27257
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David, Paul A, 1985. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 332-337, May.
    2. Polterovich, Victor, 1995. "Towards the Theory of Privatization," MPRA Paper 20151, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911.
    4. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
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    6. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    7. Cazes, Bernard, 1990. "Indicative planning in France," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 607-620, December.
    8. Lui, Francis T., 1986. "A dynamic model of corruption deterrence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 215-236, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Minzyuk, Larysa, 2010. "The development of non-monetary means of payment," MPRA Paper 28167, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
    2. Ageeva Svetlana & Suslov Nikita, 2005. "Energy Consumption and GDP in Market and Transitional Economies," EERC Working Paper Series 05-05e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    3. Sergei Guriev & Dmitry Kvassov, 2000. "Barter for price discrimination? A theory and evidence from Russia," Working Papers w0007, New Economic School (NES).
    4. S.I. Boyarchenko & S.Z. Levendorskii, 2000. "Search-Money-and-Barter Models of Financial Stabilization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 332, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    coordination failures; corruption; cultural inertia; institutional trap; multiple equilibria; path dependence; rent seeking; reputation; systemic crises; transaction costs; transformation costs; transitional rent; trust;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General

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