Институциональные Ловушки И Экономические Реформы
[Institutional Traps and Economic Reforms]
AbstractThe theory of institutional traps, i.e. ineffective but stable institutions or behavior norms, is develope din connection with economic reforms. Mechanisms are described that cause a system to get into a trap and ways of going out of it are analyzed. Concepts of transformation costs and trasitional rents are introduced. As examples of institutional traps, considered are such institutions, as barter, non-payments, tax evasion, and corruption. A game-theoretic model of the barter trap is given.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27257.
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics and Mathematical Methods 2.35(1999): pp. 1-37
coordination failures; corruption; cultural inertia; institutional trap; multiple equilibria; path dependence; rent seeking; reputation; systemic crises; transaction costs; transformation costs; transitional rent; trust;
Other versions of this item:
- Полтерович В.М., 1999. "Институциональные Ловушки И Экономические Реформы," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 35(2), Ð°Ð¿ÑÐµÐ.
- P30 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
- P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General
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