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Институциональные Ловушки И Экономические Реформы
[Institutional Traps and Economic Reforms]

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Author Info

  • Polterovich, Victor

Abstract

The theory of institutional traps, i.e. ineffective but stable institutions or behavior norms, is develope din connection with economic reforms. Mechanisms are described that cause a system to get into a trap and ways of going out of it are analyzed. Concepts of transformation costs and trasitional rents are introduced. As examples of institutional traps, considered are such institutions, as barter, non-payments, tax evasion, and corruption. A game-theoretic model of the barter trap is given.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27257.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Publication status: Published in Economics and Mathematical Methods 2.35(1999): pp. 1-37
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27257

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Related research

Keywords: coordination failures; corruption; cultural inertia; institutional trap; multiple equilibria; path dependence; rent seeking; reputation; systemic crises; transaction costs; transformation costs; transitional rent; trust;

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References

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  1. Tirole, Jean, 1994. ""A Theory of Collective Reputations" with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 38, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  2. Polterovich, Victor, 1995. "Towards the Theory of Privatization," MPRA Paper 20151, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Sato, Kazuo, 1990. "Indicative planning in Japan," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 625-647, December.
  4. David, Paul A, 1985. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 332-37, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Minzyuk, Larysa, 2010. "The development of non-monetary means of payment," MPRA Paper 28167, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
  2. Sergei Guriev & Dmitry Kvassov, 2000. "Barter for price discrimination? A theory and evidence from Russia," Working Papers w0007, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  3. Bendikov, Mikhail & Kolesnik, Georgiy, 2013. "Конкуренция Саморегулируемых Организаций И Эффективность Рынков
    [Self-regulatory organizations competition and the market efficiency]
    ," MPRA Paper 47812, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Ageeva Svetlana & Suslov Nikita, 2005. "Energy Consumption and GDP in Market and Transitional Economies," EERC Working Paper Series 05-05e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
  5. S.I. Boyarchenko & S.Z. Levendorskii, 2000. "Search-Money-and-Barter Models of Financial Stabilization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 332, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.

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