Nash Equilibrium and Robust Stability in Dynamic Games: A Small-Gain Perspective
AbstractThis paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilibrium points in dynamic games. Small-gain techniques in modern mathematical control theory are used for the first time to derive conditions guaranteeing uniqueness and global asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium point for economic models described by functional difference equations. Specification to a Cournot oligopoly game is studied in detail to demonstrate the power of the proposed methodology.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 26890.
Date of creation: 07 Jan 2010
Date of revision: 23 Sep 2010
Publication status: Published in Computers and Mathematics with Applications 11.60(2010): pp. 2936-2952
Dynamic game; Cournot oligopoly; Nash equilibrium; Robust stability; Small gain;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-01-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2011-01-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-01-16 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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