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التحقق من أثر التنسيق بين السياستين المالية والنقدية على الأهداف الاقتصادية باستخدام نموذج قياسي
[The Assessment of the Impact of the Coordination between Fiscal and Monetary Policies on Economic Objectives: Using an Empirical Model]

Author

Listed:
  • Kamal, Mona

Abstract

The objective of this study is to estimate an empirical model using pooled data for five industrialized countries to assess the impact of the coordination between monetary and fiscal policies on macroeconomic targets. Those countries are characterized with the existence of the institutional coordinating arrangements required for the success of the coordination between the two policies and the long history of implementing the stabilization policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Kamal, Mona, 2010. "التحقق من أثر التنسيق بين السياستين المالية والنقدية على الأهداف الاقتصادية باستخدام نموذج قياسي [The Assessment of the Impact of the Coordination between Fiscal and Monetary Policies on Economic O," MPRA Paper 26670, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:26670
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Herman Bennett & Norman Loayza, 2002. "Policy Biases when the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities Have Different Objectives," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 11, pages 299-330, Central Bank of Chile.
    2. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
    3. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    The coordination between monetary and fiscal policies; empirical model; Seemingly Unrelated Regression Method (SUR);
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O21 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Planning Models; Planning Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General

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