Oligarchs and the Russian government: fight against corruption or the private business?
AbstractMany scholars have interpreted the Russian government’s attack on the private oil companies, as in the most famous Yukos Crisis, as a legitimate battle against corruption. However, in the transition economies, the state can abuse its power by acting like a monopoly and not letting any competitive firms to operate. It can easily do so, by disguising its aim of retaining its monopoly power as a “fight with corruption”. In this paper we build a game between the state firm (government) and the private firm (oligarchs), where the oligarchs can be of “strong” or “weak” type. Oligarchs use the amount of bribe to signal their type, and try to influence the government’s decision of whether confiscating the private firm by accusing it of being corrupt, versus letting her operate and collecting bribe.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 26414.
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
game theory; power; Russia; transition economies; government; oligarchs; oil; privatization; corruption; bribe;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- P28 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Natural Resources; Environment
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A., 2000.
"Democratization or repression?,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 683-693, May.
- Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, 1999. "Democratization or Repression?," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 99-27, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1999. "Democratization or Repression?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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