Voting on traffic congestion policy with two levels of government
AbstractI study how the political decision process affects urban traffic congestion policy. First, I look at the case of a single government deciding, through majority voting, on a monetary charge to be paid to drive to a city's Central Business District (CBD): if the majority of individuals prefers to drive more (resp. less) than the average, a voting equilibrium with lower (higher) charge emerges. Next, I consider the case of two government levels involved in traffic policy: parking charges in (resp. cordon tolls around) a city's CBD and capacity investments are chosen by a local (resp. regional) government, through a majority voting process. While tax exporting motives and the imperfect coordination among the two governments may lead to higher overall charges than in the case of a single government, strong preferences for driving across the population can still bring to an equilibiurm with suboptimal total charges.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 24776.
Date of creation: 06 Nov 2010
Date of revision:
traffic congestion policy; cordon tolls; parking; voting; fiscal competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-11-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2010-11-13 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-11-13 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2010-11-13 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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- repec:ucp:bkecon:9781884829987 is not listed on IDEAS
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- Richard Arnott & Eren Inci, 2005.
"An Integrated Model of Downtown Parking and Traffic Congestion,"
NBER Working Papers
11118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Richard Arnott & Eren Inci, 2005. "An Integrated Model of Downtown Parking and Traffic Congestion," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 608, Boston College Department of Economics.
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