The necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of the Majority Rule in the linear domain
AbstractThis paper identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of the majority rule when individuals are never indifferent between two distinct alternatives (linear domain). By introducing the concept of the relevant population for each set of alternatives, a unique condition can be stated, and substitute the variety of conditions that already exist in the literature.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 24588.
Date of creation: 01 May 2010
Date of revision:
majority rule; transitivity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-09-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2010-09-03 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, 09.
- Sen, Amartya & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1969. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 178-202, August.
- Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 2000. "A simple characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 689-700.
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