Back to the roots: On the origins of the Fed's independence
AbstractThis note considers the foundations of the Federal Reserve Board's independence. Its origins are shown to reside in the American political philosophy, under which independence is an essential working condition for a perennial democracy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 24199.
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Federal Reserve Board; independence; constitution.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
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- NEP-HIS-2010-08-06 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-MAC-2010-08-06 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2010-08-06 (Monetary Economics)
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