Relational contract theory and management contracts: A paradigm for the application of the Theory of the Norms
AbstractThis paper examines management contracts as a paradigm for the application of relational contracts theory and especially of the theory of contractual and relational norms. This theory, deriving from Macauley's implications, but structured and analysed by I.R. MacNeil gives us a framework for the explanation and understanding of contractual obligations and business relations' rules and practice. After presenting the key literature about the norms theory and especially defining the content of MacNeil's norms, we define management contracts as relations, characterised by a high relational element and we explain why, investigating all their features, which make them a suitable object for an application of norms theory. Then, we select a list of the core obligations for the recipient, provider and both parties in such a relation and we analyse each obligation according to MacNeil's model of norms. Specifically, we test the application of specific relative norms to each obligation and we examine which norms appear in which obligation. Finally, we concentrate our results and we result to our conclusions, based on a matrix showing the strength, breadth and depth of the application of each norm, while we also compare our results to those coming up from the application of a shorter comprehensive model of norms (Austen-Baker's model). The above analysis and tests provide us valuable results about the application, significance and practical value of the theory of the norms, about the significance of each norm for business relations and finally about the potential to present a more useful and comprehensive model of norms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 24028.
Date of creation: 16 Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Relational Contracts; Macneil; Management Contracts; Norms; Contracts Law; Fiduciary Duties; Directors Duties; Law and Economics; Umbrella Contracts; Interorganisational Trust; Business Cooperation; Reciprocity; Contractual Solidarity; Comprehensive Norms; Contractual Norms; Outsourcing Contracts; relational contracts theory; hotel management agreement;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Sloof, Randolph & Sonnemans, Joep, 2011. "The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 573-594.
- Kambale Mirembe, Omer, 2013. "Customs reforms in eastern Congo (DRC): Between norms and practices," IOB Working Papers 2013.04, Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy and Management (IOB).
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