The ineffectiveness of state as a controller and owner
AbstractThe global market is largely a game without rules and without an arbitrator able to dispense necessary medicine. Undoubtedly, the crisis has caused the emergence of new challenges, which require the active role of the state in various areas. States play the role of owners of companies and market regulators. Unfortunately governments were not performing these functions adequately. Those therefore, who themselves committed many mistakes, must improve not just the mis-functioning market, but also a defectively functioning state; or, to put it otherwise, they must improve themselves.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 23933.
Date of creation: 15 May 2010
Date of revision:
state; capital markets; regulations; financial crisis;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000.
"Investor protection and corporate governance,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, . "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance," Working Paper 19455, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Schleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2001. "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance," Working Paper Series rwp01-017, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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