The transfer space
AbstractWithin the transfer space source and sink exchange material and energy to optimize their own productivity. Under certain conditions this optimization will lead to a productivity increase of the whole ensemble. The present day view that cooperation is the most productive interaction between organisms is an illusion. Whenever two not identically equipped parties meet with the potential to exchange substrates one party will become a source and the other a sink. This is realistically called exploitation. The outcome depends on the relation between fix cost, variable cost, productivity and affinity. Brute force and educational conditioning used by the sink take advantage of emotions to hide the real size of cost in exploitation. In case the transfer of substrates leads to increased productivity parts of the productivity might be reinvested to keep the exploited party. The lasting relationship is called wise exploitation. Wise exploitation may last for one or many generations depending on the use of breeding, brute force or education. All actions have to be viewed under thermodynamic considerations and the benefit must always exceed the cost to maintain a stable system. This hypothesis explains observations from catalytic networks to societies.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 23643.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2010
Date of revision:
source; sink; wise exploitation; brute force; education; emotions; fix cost; variable cost; productivity; game theory; cooperation; prisoners´ dilemma; benefit; cost; transfer space; symbiosis;
Other versions of this item:
- J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-10 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Smith, Eric & Foley, Duncan K., 2008. "Classical thermodynamics and economic general equilibrium theory," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 7-65, January.
- Ulrich Witt, 2006. "Evolutionary concepts in economics and biology," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 16(5), pages 473-476, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.