This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Proliferation of Fiscal Incentives and the Nicaraguan State as a Manager of Rents: A Political Economy Perspective on Nicaraguan Industrial Policy Since 1990

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Maas, Hauke
Abstract

This paper finds that the proliferation of fiscal incentives in the form of tax exemptions in Nicaragua since 1990 represents the indiscriminate allocation of monopoly rents to interest groups. While theory suggests some rents can encourage productive investments, Nicaragua’s tax incentives are merely “assistentialist” and lack effectiveness. For a dynamic industrial policy, opportunity costs would need to be taken into account and rents would need to be performance contingent, which requires selectivity and increased transparency.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2335/
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 2335.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 07 Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2335

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: Nicaragua; industrial policy; political economy; fiscal incentives; tax incentives; monopoly rents; rent-seeking;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Apart from a small start up grant in the 1990's, RePEc has received no funding and lives on the help of volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2010-1-6.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.