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The Financial Services Authority : A Model of Improved Accountability?

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Author Info
Ojo, Marianne

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Abstract

Prior to the adoption of the FSA (Financial Services Authority) model, supervision of UK banks was carried out by the Bank of England. Although the Bank of England's informal involvement in bank supervision dates back to the mid nineteenth century, it was only in 1979 that it acquired formal powers to grant or refuse authorization to carry out banking business in the UK. Events such as the Secondary Banking Crisis of 1973-74 and the Banking Coordination Directive of 1977 resulted in legislative changes in the form of the Banking Act 1979. Bank failures through the following years then resulted in changes to the legislative framework. This article looks into the claim that the FSA model has improved in terms of accountability in comparison to its predecessor, the Bank of England. It considers the impact the FSA has made on the financial services sector and on certain legislation since its introduction. Through a comparison with the Bank of England, previous and present legislation, reports and other sources, an assessment can be made as to whether the FSA provides more accountability. Evidence provided here supports the conclusion that the FSA is both equipped with better accountability mechanisms and executes its functions in a more accountable way than its predecessor.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 228.

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Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision: Aug 2006
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:228

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Related research
Keywords: regulators accountability supervision financial services

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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This page was last updated on 2008-7-26.


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