Общество Перманентного Перераспределения: Роль Реформ
[Permanent Redistribution Society: The Role of Reforms]
AbstractWe discuss the typical mistakes in carrying out reforms that promote redistributive activities and give rise to redistribution cycles; each cycle includes the stages of reform, stabilization and recovery. We provide arguments that show that a possible way out of the institutional backwardness trap is a rational combination of institutional reforms and policies to stimulate economic growth.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 22526.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
reforms; redistribution; institutional trap;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- P30 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
- P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General
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- Li, David D, 1998. "Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 393-97, May.
- Andrew Berg, 1994. "The Logistics of Privatization in Poland," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: Restructuring, pages 165-188 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- David D. Li, 1998. "Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan 130, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
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