Whose incentives? The evolution of inheritance practices, intergenerational conflict, and women’s control over land in rural Kenya
AbstractLand related investment decisions are shaped by both the formal and informal institutions governing land tenure and acquisition. In the case of agricultural Kikuyu households in Kenya, we show that the inheritance practice of uncertain allocation in conjunction with the principle of equal division among heirs reduces long-term investments in land among potential heirs. This apparent inefficiency is explained by intergenerational power dynamics within the household, as the inheritance practice allows parents to shift the investment incentives facing heirs in their favor. This analytical framework is also used to illustrate that despite legislation formalizing women’s rights to property, control over land continues to follow the informal traditional patrilineal system in important ways.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 21770.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Inheritance; agriculture; Kenya;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2010-04-11 (Africa)
- NEP-AGR-2010-04-11 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2010-04-11 (Development)
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