Fibonacci Hierarchies for Decision Making
AbstractAll decisions are practically made within a chainwise social setup named a decision-making chain (DMC). This paper considers some cases of an idea (a project proposal) propagating through an organizational DMC. Survival of a proposal through successive links of the DMC depends on the relative power of those links, in addition to proposal’s intrinsic value. Then it is not impossible to reject a good proposal or to fail to reject a bad proposal, either of which may generate undesired, though not detrimental, outcomes. We consider here a simple metric to assess quality of decision-making. The notion of quality here derives from “not declining (not accepting) a project that is of high (poor) intrinsic value”. As Fibonacci series establish the mathematical basis of our proposed metric, metric is simply named a Fibonacci metric.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20973.
Date of creation: 25 Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Decision making chains; Innovation; Fairness metric; Fibonacci series;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
- C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
- A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-HPE-2010-03-13 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2010-03-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PPM-2010-03-13 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
- NEP-UPT-2010-03-13 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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