Strategic complementarity and substitutability without transitive indifference
AbstractWe study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the indifference relation(s) need not be transitive. Two results are obtained about the existence of a monotone selection from the best response correspondence when both strategies and parameters form chains. Two more results are obtained about the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where strategy sets are chains, but monotone selections from the best response correspondences need not exist.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20714.
Date of creation: 15 Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Strong acyclicity; interval order; single crossing; monotone selection; Nash equilibrium;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-02-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2010-02-27 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-GTH-2010-02-27 (Game Theory)
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