We examine Latin American foreign exchange intervention in a framework where the exchange rate regime is endogenous and there exists an inefficient, equilibrium foreign exchange intervention bias. The model suggests that greater central bank independence is associated with lesser intervention in the foreign exchange market, and also with leaning-against-the-wind intervention. Both results are confirmed by data from 13 Latin American countries.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
1982.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
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