Games in the Eurasian gas supply network: Multinational bargaining, Strategic investment, and Hold-up
AbstractThe paper analyzes multilateral relations and distortions of investments in the Eurasian gas network, supplying gas from countries of the Former Soviet Union to Western Europe. We use a two stage model of endogenous coalition formation to study cooperation among gas producers and transiters, some lacking the ability to make long-term commitments. In the first stage, the players cooperate to invest in pipelines and contract the sharing of rents. In the second stage, players form supply chains and bargain over supply profit sharing. Since competing supply chains can be formed, cooperation involves externalities. Our quantitative analysis predicts overinvestment as well as underinvestment in the network as an attempt to create countervailing power. Among other things we explain why Russia invests in the expensive pipeline through the Baltic sea and why Caspian gas producers are eager to build expensive bypasses around Russia.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17852.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision: Nov 2008
strategic investment; hold-up; coalitional bargaining; gas supply; externalities;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- Q10 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - General
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- Yi, Sang-Seung & Shin, Hyukseung, 2000. "Endogenous formation of research coalitions with spillovers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 229-256, February.
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