The Federal Approach to FiscalDecentralisation: Conceptual Contours for Policy Makers
AbstractChanchal Kumar Sharma,in his paper demonstrates that in order for fiscal decentralisation to be effective, it must be approached federally. A federal approach is not a decentralised approach but a dynamically balanced approach; one that constantly keeps on adjusting the contrasting forces of centralisation and decentralisation to create a system that can ensure good governance in accordance with the rapidly changing global and local scenario. According to the author, the good governance of the present time has to be federally flexible and dynamically decentralised and institutions of fiscal federalism are crucial for achieving such a dynamic equilibrium. Fiscal decentralisation cannot be detached from the broader principles of fiscal federalism if it is to be successful, irrespective of the fact of whether it is being carried out in a federal or non-federal country. He argues that too much decentralisation or an overly strong central federal government precludes the survival of a constitutional federal state.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 178.
Date of creation: May 2003
Date of revision: May 2005
Publication status: Published in Loyola Journal of Social Sciences No.(2).Vol. ((2005): pp. 169-188
Federalism; Fiscal Decentralization; centralization;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-10-14 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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