Retaliatory disagreement point with asymmetric countries. Evidence from European wine sector during enlargement
AbstractThe vector space model facilitates a very useful representation of the strategic interaction in trade because it is possible to incorporate both symmetric and asymmetric features of the players. This paper characterizes the Nash solution of the non-cooperative international trade game in the orthogonal vector space. We have used the standard properties of the Nash solution to determine if the non-cooperative action-reaction trade policy space should be written in terms of 'import-import' or 'import-export' quotas as strongest punishment. The trade policy space defined by import-export' quotas is not a Nash solution of the non-cooperative game but an improvement in the disagreement set. We show the positive correlation between import and export quotas using data on trade relations between EU-15, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria for wine sector during 1995-2005. In our model the outcome of the non-cooperative trade is autarky. Retaliation is played when countries restrict their imports to one third of the national optimum.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17757.
Date of creation: 15 Jun 2009
Date of revision: 03 Oct 2009
asymmetries; quotas; non-cooperative game; disagreement points; Nash solution;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tower, Edward, 1975. "The Optimum Quota and Retaliation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 623-30, October.
- Harvey Lapan & Jean-Philippe Gervais, 2004. "The Nonequivalence of Import and Export Quotas in Strategic Equilibrium," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 130-137, 02.
- Constantinos Syropoulos & Elias Dinopoulos & Mordechai E. Kreinin, 1995. "Bilateral Quota Wars," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(4a), pages 939-44, November.
- Nakanishi, Noritsugu, 1999. "Reexamination of the International Export Quota Game through the Theory of Social Situations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 132-152, April.
- Cadot, Olivier & de Melo, Jaime & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 1998. "Harmonizing External Quotas in a FTA: A Step Backward?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.