Retaliatory disagreement point with asymmetric countries. Evidence from European wine sector during enlargement

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Retaliatory disagreement point with asymmetric countries. Evidence from European wine sector during enlargement

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PERJU, Genoveva Elena

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Genoveva Elena Perju

Abstract

The vector space model facilitates a very useful representation of the strategic interaction in trade because it is possible to incorporate both symmetric and asymmetric features of the players. This paper characterizes the Nash solution of the non-cooperative international trade game in the orthogonal vector space. We have used the standard properties of the Nash solution to determine if the non-cooperative action-reaction trade policy space should be written in terms of 'import-import' or 'import-export' quotas as strongest punishment. The trade policy space defined by import-export' quotas is not a Nash solution of the non-cooperative game but an improvement in the disagreement set. We show the positive correlation between import and export quotas using data on trade relations between EU-15, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria for wine sector during 1995-2005. In our model the outcome of the non-cooperative trade is autarky. Retaliation is played when countries restrict their imports to one third of the national optimum.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17757.

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Date of creation: 15 Jun 2009
Date of revision: 03 Oct 2009
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17757

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Country and Industry Studies of Trade
F51 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2009-10-17 (All new papers)
NEP-TRA-2009-10-17 (Transition Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
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Nakanishi, Noritsugu, 1999. "Reexamination of the International Export Quota Game through the Theory of Social Situations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 132-152, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Harvey Lapan & Jean-Philippe Gervais, 2004. "The Nonequivalence of Import and Export Quotas in Strategic Equilibrium," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(1), pages 130-137, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cadot, Olivier & de Melo, Jaime & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 1998. "Harmonizing External Quotas in a FTA: A Step Backward?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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