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Author Info
Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy

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Abstract

Allocating property rights on an open access resource which has been freely exploited in the past is often very problematic. Involved agents typically rely on one of two competing principles to determine future allocation: grandfathering or historical accountability. One prominent example is the case of allocating property rights over $CO_2$ emissions: developed countries typically argue that they should not be penalized for their high volumes of past emissions, because it simply translates their more intense economic development history (claim for a "grandfathering" allocation) while developing countries typically argue that they should obtain more property rights because of their future needs (claim for "historical accountability"). We construct a simple model inspired by the claims problem literature to show that these two positions are in fact compatible: they define bounds to the set of possible allocations. We explicit a family of methods which meets these bounds and characterize the two extreme points of this family: the equal sharing and the uniform gains methods.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17726/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17726.

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Date of creation: Sep 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17726

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Related research
Keywords: Property rights allocation; environmental economics; climate change; international agreement; distributive justice.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Young, H Peyton, 1990. "Progressive Taxation and Equal Sacrifice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 253-66, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 2001. "The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 307-328, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Moulin, Herve, 1992. "Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 373-401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  5. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  6. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gerlagh, Reyer & Keyzer, Michiel A., 2001. "Sustainability and the intergenerational distribution of natural resource entitlements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 315-341, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2004. "Sustainability, exemption, and the constrained equal awards rule: a note," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 103-110, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.

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