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On Time Consistency in Stackelberg Differential Games

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  • Mino, Kazuo

Abstract

This paper explores a class of Stackelberg differential games in which the open-loop strategies of the leader satisfies time consistency. We show that in this class of games the open-loop equilibrium coincides with the corresponding feedback equilibrium. The analytical framework used in this paper involves the models examined by the several recent contributions to the time consistency issue as special cases.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17028/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17028.

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Date of creation: Jul 2001
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17028

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Related research

Keywords: Stackelberg differential game; open-loop equilibrium; feedback equilibrium; time consistency;

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References

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  1. Kenneth L. Judd, 1982. "Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 572, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Kemp, Murray C & Long, Ngo Van & Shimomura, Koji, 1993. "Cyclical and Noncyclical Redistributive Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(2), pages 415-29, May.
  3. Mino, Kazuo, 2001. "Optimal taxation in dynamic economies with increasing returns," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 235-253, August.
  4. Danyang Xie, 2002. "On Time Inconsistency: A Technical Issue in Stackelberg Differential Games," Macroeconomics, EconWPA 0212004, EconWPA.
  5. Lansing, Kevin J., 1999. "Optimal redistributive capital taxation in a neoclassical growth model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 423-453, September.
  6. Chamley, Christophe, 1986. "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 607-22, May.
  7. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329.
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Cited by:
  1. Mino, Kazuo, 2000. "Optimal Taxation in Dynamic Economies with Increasing Returns," MPRA Paper 17324, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Mino, Kazuo, 2004. "On the Generalized Weitzman's Rule," MPRA Paper 16996, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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