Bonus, effort, costs, market size and teams' performance
AbstractThis paper examines the effects of a win bonus, effort, costs and team size, on the demand for talented players, the win percentage and the profits of small and big teams. Teams play a Cournot game, under the following objective functions: (i) teams maximize profits, (ii) teams maximize win percentage, (iii) the small team maximizes profit and the big win percentage, and (iv) vice versa. The effects are based on a priori selected parameter values and bounds, as well as from optimal solutions of non-linear programs, by maximizing anyone of the four win percentage formulae, derived from the respective Cournot reaction functions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 16989.
Date of creation: 28 Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Teams; talents; effort; win bonus; win percentage; competitive balance; profits;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
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- Helmut Dietl & Markus Lang & Alexander Rathke, 2009.
"The Combined Effect of Salary Restrictions and Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues,"
0027, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA), revised Jan 2010.
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- Helmut Dietl & Markus Lang & Alexander Rathke, 2009. "The Combined Effect of Salary Restrictions and Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues," Working Papers 0102, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Jan 2010.
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"Wage Dispersion and Team Performance - An Empirical Panel Analysis,"
0073, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
- Egon Franck & Stephan Nüesch, 2007. "Wage Dispersion and Team Performance - An Empirical Panel Analysis," Working Papers 0017, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
- Stefan Szymanski & Stefan KÈsenne, 2004.
"Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 165-177, 03.
- SZYMANSKI, Stefan & KÉSENNE, Stefan, 2003. "Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports," Working Papers 2003003, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
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