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The endogenous nature of social preferences

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  • Smith, John

Abstract

This paper presents evidence which challenges the view that techniques which are designed to measure the social preferences of subjects can always be accomplished in a nonintrusive manner. We find evidence that such measurements can influence the preferences which they are designed to measure. Researchers often measure social preferences by posing a series of dictator game allocation decisions; we use a particular technique, Social Value Orientation (SVO). In our experiment we vary the order of the SVO measurement and a lager stakes dictator game. We find that subjects with prosocial preferences act even more prosocially when the SVO measurement is administered first, whereas those with selfish preferences are unaffected by the order of the measurement. Additionally, we find evidence that this difference is driven by the presence of choices involving the size of surplus.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 16599.

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Date of creation: 04 Aug 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:16599

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Related research

Keywords: Other-Regarding Preferences; Social Value Orientation; Dictator Game;

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References

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  1. Ruffle, Bradley J., 1998. "More Is Better, But Fair Is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 247-265, May.
  2. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," General Economics and Teaching 0303002, EconWPA.
  3. Gert Cornelissen & Siegfried Dewitte & Luk Warlop, 2007. "Social Value Orientation as a Moral Intuition: Decision-Making in the Dictator Game," Working Papers 322, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
  5. Neil Buckley & Stuart Mestelman & Mohamed Shehata, 1999. "Subsidizing Public Inputs," Department of Economics Working Papers 1999-11, McMaster University.
  6. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
  7. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2003. "Is fairness used instrumentally? Evidence from sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 467-489, August.
  8. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2005. "Managing diversity by creating team identity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 371-392, November.
  9. Gert Cornelissen & Siegfried Dewitte & Luk Warlop, 2007. "Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game," Economics Working Papers 1028, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  10. James Andreoni & John Miller, 2002. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 737-753, March.
  11. Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Beil Richard O., 1993. "Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 485-504, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Libman, Alexander, 2012. "Перераспределительные Конфликты И Факторы Культуры В Новой Политической Экономии
    [Redistributive Conflicts and Culture in the
    ," MPRA Paper 48192, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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