The performance of local government in the execution of public works
AbstractThis paper aims at analysing the procurement of public works paying attention to the level of government involved. Such an issue has not received so far attention in the literature on fiscal federalism nor in the public works procurement literature. We focus the attention upon the execution stage of public works: indeed, their efficient provision and their capability to deliver the planned benefits are severely affected by the problems arising at the execution stage because of the incompleteness of the underlying contract. The main result is that local governments seem to be less efficient in the management of the execution process, suffering from longer delays than central government. This phenomenon is more severe for small municipalities and when the contract is mainly financed with external resources.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 16094.
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
public procurement; local government; soft budget;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2009-07-11 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2009-07-11 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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