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Perfect correlated equilibria in stopping games

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  • Heller, Yuval

Abstract

We prove that every undiscounted multi-player stopping game in discrete time admits an approximate correlated equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium has five appealing properties: (1) “Trembling-hand” perfectness - players do not use non-credible threats; (2) Normal-form correlation - communication is required only before the game starts; (3) Uniformness - it is an approximate equilibrium in any long enough finite-horizon game and in any discounted game with high enough discount factor; (4) Universal correlation device -the device does not depend on the specific parameters of the game. (5) Canonical - the signal each player receives is equivalent to the strategy he plays in equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 15646.

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Date of creation: 10 Jun 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15646

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Keywords: stochastic games; stopping games; correlated equilibrium; perfect equilibrium; Ramsey Theorem.;

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  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Myerson, R B, 1986. "Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 133-54.
  3. Barry Nalebuff & John G. Riley, 1984. "Asymmetric Equilibrium in the War of Attrition," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 317, UCLA Department of Economics.
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