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An Attempt to Control Tax Evasion

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  • Rosato, Antonio

Abstract

The main object of this paper is the study of tax evasion from a theoretical point of view. We construct a simple two-player model in order to analyze the interaction between the taxpayer and the IRS and the main tool we use is game theory. We derive equilibrium solutions for the static game and we also provide some interesting comparative statics results. Then, we develop a dynamic game over an infinite number of periods. We show and comment two different kinds of long-run equlibria.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15084/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 15084.

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Date of creation: 06 Jul 2006
Date of revision: 07 May 2009
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15084

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Keywords: Tax Evasion; Policy; Game Theory;

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References

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  1. Kaplow, Louis, 1990. "Optimal taxation with costly enforcement and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 221-236, November.
  2. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
  3. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1994. " Tax Evasion, Concealment and the Optimal Linear Income Tax," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(2), pages 219-39.
  4. Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 9610, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  5. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, Elsevier, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier.
  6. Mayshar, Joram, 1991. " Taxation with Costly Administration," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 93(1), pages 75-88.
  7. Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
  8. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-73, August.
  9. Thierry Verdier & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March.
  10. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
  11. Antonio Acconcia, 2006. "Endogenous Corruption and Tax Evasion in a Dynamic Model," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy 154, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Nov 2006.
  12. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
  13. Kolm, Serge-Christophe, 1973. "A note on optimum tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 265-270, July.
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