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Commerce équitable et signaux : entre information et illusion
[Fair trade and signalling: information and illusion]

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Lupton, Sylvie

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Abstract

Literature on signals has developed the importance of signals to inform consumers on product quality. However, a majority of economists suppose that the signals perfectly indicate quality to consumers, and that their perceptions correspond to the real quality issued by signals. Most economists have not considered situations of extreme asymmetrical information (Parker, 1995)in which consumers have an illusion about the signalled quality. This illusion is the condition of the functioning of certain markets, and especially applies to Potemkin goods (Tietzel and Weber, 1991), for which neither the consumer nor exterior institutions can control the quality of goods. Hence, the percieved quality of the good does not correspond to the good's actual quality. Our paper sheds lights on the question of a quality illusion shared by consumers, that is not dealt with by signals. The market functions perfectly well, albeit this illusion on product quality. This will be based on an empirical case study of fair trade signals on goods.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14560.

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Date of creation: 09 Apr 2009
Date of revision: 28 Mar 2009
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14560

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Related research
Keywords: Signals; faire trade; asymmetrical information; illusion; product quality;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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