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Competition Law, Cartel Enforcement & Leniency Program

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Author Info
Samà, Danilo

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Abstract

The present assessment focuses the attention on the antitrust action in detecting and fighting oligopolistic collusion, analyzing the development of the innovative and modern leniency policy. Following the examination of the main conditions and reasons for cartel stability and sustainability, our attempt is to comprehend under which circumstances leniency program represents a functional and successful tool for preventing the formation of anti-competitive agreements. The problem statement that follows is therefore: how can Law&Economics approach help competition authorities to achieve and realize this form of enforcement?

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14104/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14104.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14104

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Related research
Keywords: Antitrust Cartels Enforcement Game Theory Leniency Program Oligopolistic Markets;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Carl Shapiro, 1989. "The Theory of Business Strategy," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 125-137, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Phlips, Louis, 1996. "On the detection of collusion and predation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 495-510, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

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