Competition Law, Cartel Enforcement & Leniency Program
AbstractThe present assessment focuses the attention on the antitrust action in detecting and fighting oligopolistic collusion, analyzing the development of the innovative and modern leniency policy. Following the examination of the main conditions and reasons for cartel stability and sustainability, our attempt is to comprehend under which circumstances leniency program represents a functional and successful tool for preventing the formation of anti-competitive agreements. The problem statement that follows is therefore: how can Law&Economics approach help competition authorities to achieve and realize this form of enforcement?
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14104.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2008
Date of revision:
Antitrust Cartels Enforcement Game Theory Leniency Program Oligopolistic Markets;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-03-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2009-03-22 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-REG-2009-03-22 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, December.
- Phlips, Louis, 1996. "On the detection of collusion and predation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 495-510, April.
- Luís M. B. Cabral, 2000. "Introduction to Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262032864, January.
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