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Firms as monitor of other firms: mutual guarantee institutions and SME finance

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Author Info
Columba, Francesco
Leonardo, Gambacorta
Paolo Emilio , Mistrulli

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Abstract

A large body of literature has shown that small firms, due to their opaqueness, may find it difficult to access the credit market. Informational asymmetries may be mitigated by posting collateral or by building relationships with lenders (relationship lending). However, in some cases, due to a lack of collateral or of a long credit history, small enterprises may still find it very difficult to raise external finance unless alternative contracting schemes emerge. In particular, group lending or similarly micro-finance are examples of such alternative lending contracts. In this paper, we investigate the effect of mutual guarantee institutions (MGI) on loan interest rates. We argue that, similarly to group lending and micro-finance, firms affiliated to a MGI are linked by a joint responsibility for the loan providing MGI affiliates with peer monitoring incentives. Indeed, each MGI member contributes to the guarantee fund that is then posted as collateral to loans granted to MGI members. As a consequence, MGI willingness to post collateral signals firms creditworthiness to banks. The econometric analysis supports the hypothesis that these consortia improve lending conditions for small firms.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14032.

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Date of creation: 12 Mar 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14032

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Related research
Keywords: credit guarantee schemes; group lending; joint liability; microfinance; peer monitoring; small business finance.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, 1999. "On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 79-104, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Pozzolo, Alberto Franco, 2004. "The Role of Guarantees in Bank Lending," Economics & Statistics Discussion Papers esdp04021, University of Molise, Dept. SEGeS. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 2000. "Group lending with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 773-784, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Chakraborty, Atreya & Hu, Charles X., 2006. "Lending relationships in line-of-credit and nonline-of-credit loans: Evidence from collateral use in small business," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 86-107, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Collusion and group lending with adverse selection," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 329-348, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Beck, Thorsten & Klapper, Leora F. & Mendoza, Juan Carlos, 2008. "The typology of partial credit guarantee funds around the world," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4771, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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