This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Market Share Discounts and Investment Incentives

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Sloev, Igor

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The paper investigates pro- and anticompetitive e¤ects of the use of market share discounts (MSD’s). While MSD’s can be used for exploiting a dominant position and may lead to a welfare reduction, MSD’s also can serve as an e¢ cient device for the creation of incentives. Particularly, if a nal demand for an upstream manufacturer’s good depends on a promotional e¤ort of a retailer, the manufacturer can e¤ectively use MSD’s to induce an optimal level of the retailer’s e¤ort. Moreover, it is possible that MSD’s have a positive impact both on the consumers’surplus and the total industry pro ts. Thus the use of MSD’s should not be treated as an anticompetitive practice a priori, but rather it has to be judged on a case-by-case basis.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13990/
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13990.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13990

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: market-share discounts; vertical restraints; incentives.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Katz, Michael L., 1989. "Vertical contractual relations," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 655-721 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1987. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1057-62, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All full texts are decentralized with the publishers, none reside on this server, thus making it possible to offer this service for free to all parties.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-6.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.