بحران مالی جهانی و شکست الگوی سرمایهداری نئو لیبرال یا آمریکائی
[Global financial crisis and the failure of neo-liberal or American model of capitalism]
AbstractThe paper first investigates the causes of the recent financial and liquidity crisis in the US and all over the world as a preliminary phase of the imminent recession. It then questions Paulson-Bernanke’s plan as a solution to the crisis and ponders over the differences between EU plan and the American one. Finally, it provides an overview of some apparent consequences of the crisis and anticipates some major critical issues in the future. The crux of the paper is to argue that the easy money policy and lack of the state regulation which are usually regarded as the causes of the crisis should be understood as the specific features of a particular model of accumulation, namely the neo-liberal or American type of capitalism. The roots of the crisis lie in this type of accumulation. In this context, Paulson-Bernanke’s plan provides only a further impetus to merging and acquisitions in the banking sector, a process that has already led to the emergence of three giant banks, namely Stanley Morgan Chase, Bank of America and Citicorp. In fact, if the Glass-Steagall Act has become discredited in the nineties, the concentration of the banking sector during this recent crisis make the whole financial system more fragile and vulnerable to systemic risks. Moreover, the state will be hold up by giant banks and should bailout them whenever they encounter financial difficulties.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13217.
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Ettela'at 253-254.23(2008): pp. 4-33
Global financial crisi; American model of capitalsim; merging and acquistion in the banking sector; Fordism and post-Fordism; shareholding capitalism; Systemic risk;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Ben S. Bernanke, 1983.
"Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression,"
NBER Working Papers
1054, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernanke, Ben S, 1983. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 257-76, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.