Banking on Democracy: The Political Economy of International Private Bank Lending in Emerging Markets
AbstractClearly, a new agenda is emerging for private international banks. Political issues such as human rights seem to be a current concern. But what about democracy? What about political regimes? Are they taken into account by private banks when they decide whether to invest in a country? Put another way, do private banks have democratic political preferences? In this article, we focus on cross-border lending from international bank(er)s. The questions asked are as follows. Do bank(er)s react positively (that is by increasing their lending) when an emerging democracy appears? Do we witness increased bank lending after democratic transitions? Lastly, is there any relation between democratic consolidation and bank lending?
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 12907.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Banks; Capital flows; Democracy; Emerging markets;
Other versions of this item:
- Javier Rodríguez & Javier Santiso, 2007. "Banking on Democracy: The Political Economy of International Private Bank Lending in Emerging Markets," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 259, OECD Publishing.
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2009-01-24 (Banking)
- NEP-POL-2009-01-24 (Positive Political Economics)
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