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A Note on Intrinsic Correlation

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  • Du, Songzi
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    Abstract

    In this note we characterize the strategic implication of intrinsic correlation, introduced by Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008), in the subjective correlated equilibrium setting of a complete information game. Intrinsic correlation restricts correlation devices to variables within the game, i.e. players's beliefs (and higher order beliefs) about each other's strategies, in contrast to signals or sunspots from the "outside." The characterization is a strengthening of best-response set with an injectivity condition for a certain subset identified by an iterative procedure. We also give an iterative procedure, analogous to the iterated removals of dominated strategies, that arrives at strategies consistent with our characterization, which always exist.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 12698.

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    Date of creation: 08 Dec 2008
    Date of revision: 12 Jan 2009
    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:12698

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    Keywords: game theory; correlated equilibrium; rationalizability; intrinsic correlation; higher order beliefs; redundant types; epistemics;

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    1. S. Hart & A. Mas-Collel, 2010. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 572, David K. Levine.
    2. AUMANN, Robert J., . "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Brandenburger, Adam & Friedenberg, Amanda, 2008. "Intrinsic correlation in games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 28-67, July.
    4. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    5. Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui, 2003. "Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1394, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
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