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Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists

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Lipatov, Vilen

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Abstract

Economists agree that accounting specialists are helpful in avoiding taxes. We argue that such help can often be called sophisticated evasion. We analyze it in a game of incomplete information played by tax authority, corporate taxpayers and accounting specialist. When sophisticated evasion is very common, marginal changes in enforcement are not effective, so radical measures are needed for improving compliance. Fines on firms as opposed to specialist are more effective in facilitating such measures. When the evasion is modest, auditing and accounting costs as opposed to fines are more effective in curbing it.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1250/
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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4223/
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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11197/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1250.

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Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision: Oct 2008
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1250

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Related research
Keywords: tax evasion tax avoidance sophisticated evasion

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Crocker, Keith J. & Slemrod, Joel, 2005. "Corporate tax evasion with agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1593-1610, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 739-60, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Friedrich Schneider & Dominik H. Enste, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lipatov, Vilen, 2006. "Tax Evasion and Coordination," MPRA Paper 1251, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2006. [Downloadable!]
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