The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents

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The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents

Author Info

Behringer, Stefan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Stefan Behringer

Abstract

This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. What distinguishes the public good investigated in this analysis is its direct provision technology which is commonplace in modern information technologies.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11796.

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Date of creation: 12 Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11796

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Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Stefan Behringer, 2005. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents," JEPS Working Papers 05-007, JEPS.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-12-01 (All new papers)
NEP-IPR-2008-12-01 (Intellectual Property Rights)
NEP-PBE-2008-12-01 (Public Economics)
NEP-PUB-2008-12-01 (Public Finance)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2008. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," NBER Working Papers 13797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1441R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2006. [Downloadable!]
Gueth,Werner & Hellwig,Martin, 1986. "The private supply of a public good," Discussion Paper Serie A 40, University of Bonn, Germany.
Other versions:
- Werner Güth & Martin Hellwig, 1986. "The private supply of a public good," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 121-159, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
d'Aspremont, Claude & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 389-404, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Claude d'Aspremont & Sudipto Battacharya & Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet, 1993. "Knowledge as a Public Good: Efficient Sharing and Incentives for Development Effort," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 93-50, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- D'Aspremont, C. & Bhattacharya, S. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1993. "Knowledge as a Public Good: Efficient Sharing and Incentives for Development Effort," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 93a18, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2000. "Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 318-342, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberts, John, 1976. "The incentives for correct revelation of preferences and the number of consumers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 359-374, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lehrer, Ehud & Neeman, Zvika, 2000. "The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(2), pages 309-26, April.
Martin F. Hellwig, 2003. "Public-Good Provision with Many Participants," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(3), pages 589-614, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.

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