The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents
AbstractThis paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. What distinguishes the public good investigated in this analysis is its direct provision technology which is commonplace in modern information technologies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11796.
Date of creation: 12 Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Public Goods; Direct Provision; Asymmetric Information; Mechanism Design; Open Source Software;
Other versions of this item:
- Stefan Behringer, 2005. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents," JEPS Working Papers 05-007, JEPS.
- B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-IPR-2008-12-01 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-PBE-2008-12-01 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2008-12-01 (Public Finance)
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