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The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents

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  • Behringer, Stefan

Abstract

This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. What distinguishes the public good investigated in this analysis is its direct provision technology which is commonplace in modern information technologies.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11796/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11796.

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Date of creation: 12 Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11796

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Keywords: Public Goods; Direct Provision; Asymmetric Information; Mechanism Design; Open Source Software;

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  1. Werner Güth & Martin Hellwig, 1986. "The private supply of a public good," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 121-159, December.
  2. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1441R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2006.
  3. d'Aspremont, Claude & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 389-404, November.
  4. Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Martin F. Hellwig, 2003. "Public-Good Provision with Many Participants," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 589-614, 07.
  6. Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July.
  7. Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188, October.
  8. Lehrer, Ehud & Neeman, Zvika, 2000. "The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 309-26, April.
  9. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2000. "Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 318-342, June.
  10. Roberts, John, 1976. "The incentives for correct revelation of preferences and the number of consumers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 359-374, November.
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